Abstracting Gradual Typing (AGT) is an approach to systematically deriving gradual counterparts to static type disciplines (Garcia et al. 2016) . The approach consists of defining the semantics of gradual types by interpreting them as sets of static types, and then defining an optimal abstraction back to gradual types. These operations are used to lift the static discipline to the gradual setting. The runtime semantics of the gradual language then arises as reductions on gradual typing derivations.
Introduction
Gradual typing has often been viewed as a means to combine the agility benefits of dynamic languages, like Python and Ruby with the reliability benefits of static languages like OCaml and Scala. This paper, in a line of work on the foundations of gradual typing, explores the idea that static and dynamic are merely relative notions.
This relativistic view of gradual typing is not new. Work on gradual information flow security by Disney and Flanagan (2011) and Fennell and Thiemann (2013) develop languages where only information-flow security properties are subject to a mix of dynamic and static checking. Bañados Schwerter et al. (2014) develop a language where only computational effect capabilities are gradualized. In each of these cases, the "fully-dynamic" corner of the gradual language is not dynamic at all by typical standards, but rather simply typed. However, those languages support seamless migration toward a more precise typing discipline that subsumes simple typing.
To explore this notion, we revisit the idea of gradual informationflow security. Our tool of inquiry is a new approach to the foundations of gradual typing called Abstracting Gradual Typing (AGT) (Garcia et al. 2016) . AGT is a technique for systematically deriving gradual type systems by interpreting gradual types as sets of static types. That work developed a traditional gradual type system with subtyping, introducing an unknown type ?. But AGT was directly inspired by Bañados Schwerter et al. (2014) , who used an early version of these techniques to gradualize only effects. However, they develop the dynamic semantics of gradual effects in the traditional ad hoc fashion. Here, we bring the approach full circle, deriving a complete static and dynamic semantics for a gradual counterpart to the λSEC language of Zdancewic (2002) .
In their simplest form, security-typed languages require values and types to be annotated with security labels, indicating their confidentiality level. The security type system guarantees noninterference, i.e., that more-confidential information does not alter the lessconfidential results of any expression.
We prove that the resulting gradual language, called λ
SEC
, is not only safe in that it never unexpectedly crashes, but that it is sound in that it honours the information-flow invariants of the precisely typed terms. The former property is unsurprising, since even the most imprecisely typed program still maintains the simple typing discipline, which is enough to establish the safety of the operational semantics. The soundness of the language with respect to the security type discipline, i.e., that basic information flow properties are respected, is the key property.
The prior work in gradual security typing developed gradual cast languages, which require explicit type casts to connect imprecisely typed terms with precisely typed terms. This is akin to the intermediate languages of traditional gradually-typed languages. This work presents the first gradual source language, where no explicit casts are needed: they are introduced by the language semantics. Furthermore, following the AGT approach, the runtime semantics are induced by the proof of type safety for λSEC, yielding a crisp connection to that precise static type discipline.
As with the original work on AGT, we can straightforwardly establish proper adaptations of the refined criteria for gradually typed languages. We will do so in this ongoing work.
Ultimately this work views gradual typing as a theory of imprecise typing rather than dynamic checking. Indeed dynamic checking is an inevitable consequence of this approach, but the focus here is on the types and their meaning. We believe that this broader view of gradual typing can widen the reach of gradual typing beyond its current niche of interest among dynamic language enthusiasts. Furthermore, we believe that AGT generalizes the foundations of gradual typing enough to support a wide variety of gradual type disciplines.
The Static Language: λ SEC
We first present the λSEC language, with some differences from the original presentation (Zdancewic 2002) . The most notable changes are that the type system is syntax directed, and the runtime semantics are small-step structural operational semantics rather than bigstep natural semantics. Figure 1 presents the syntax and type system for λSEC. The language extends a simple typing discipline with a lattice of security labels ℓ. All program values are ascribed security labels, which are partial ordered from low security to high-security and include top and bottom security labels ⊤ and ⊥. The λSEC types S extend
S undefined otherwise Figure 1 . λSEC: Syntax and Static Semantics a simple type discipline by associating a security label to each type constructor. Rules for variables, constants and functions are straightforward. The (S⊕) rule for binary boolean operations ensures that the confidentiality of combining two values is the least upper bound, or join ≺ , of the confidentiality of the two sub-expressions. Similarly, when applying a function (Sapp), the result type joins the label of the function's result type S12 with the label ℓ of the function type. For this, the rule uses a notion of label stamping on types:
Rule (Sapp) also appeals to a notion of subtyping S <: S. Subtyping is induced by the ordering on security labels. It allows lowersecurity values to flow to higher-security contexts, but not vice- 1 We overload the join notation ≺ throughout, and rely on the context to disambiguate.
Figure 2. λSEC: Small-Step Dynamic Semantics versa. Rule (Sif) specifies that the type of a conditional is the subtyping join <: of the types of the branches, further stamped to incorporate the confidentiality of the predicate expression's label l. The latter is necessary to forbid indirect flow of information through the conditional. As usual, the join of two function types is defined in terms of the meet <: of the argument types, which in turn relies on the label meet operator ≺ . The (S::) rule introduces ascription, which can move the type of an expression to any supertype.
These syntax-directed typing rules define a type system that is sound and complete with respect to Zdancewic's. The following propositions use ⊢ Z for the type system of Zdancewic (2002) , and consider only terms without ascription (i.e., the common subset of the two systems).
Proof. By induction on Γ ⊢ t : S.
Proof. By induction on Γ ⊢ Z t : S.
Dynamic semantics. The dynamic semantics of λSEC were originally presented as big step semantics (Zdancewic 2002) . Figure 2 presents the equivalent small-step semantics. Of particular interest is the new label stamping form on terms, which we call term stamping t ≺ ℓ. Term stamping allows small-step reduction to retain security information that is merged with the resulting value of the nested term.
This small-step semantics coincides with the big-step semantics of λSEC (Zdancewic 2002) . Note that we establish the equivalence to the source λSEC language (Figure 1) , i.e., without term stamping, since it is only needed internally to support small-step reduction. As usual, −→ * denotes the reflexive, transitive closure of −→.
Proposition 3. t ⇓ v if and only if
t −→ * v.
Proof.
Case (only if). By induction on t ⇓ v, using the admissibility of the ⇓ rules in −→ * .
Case (if). By induction on the length of the reduction t −→ * v. Straightforward case analysis on t using the admissibility of the inversion lemmas for ⇓ in −→ * .
Gradualizing λ SEC
In gradualizing λSEC, we could decide to support unknown information in both types and security labels. Here, to show the flexibility of the AGT approach, we gradualize λSEC only in terms of security labels, thereby supporting a gradual evolution between simplytyped programs and securely-typed programs.
Meaning of Unknown Security Type Information
To gradualize our security types, we introduce a notion of gradual labels and define their meanings in terms of concrete labels of a given security lattice.
Definition 1 (Gradual labels).
A gradual labell is either a label ℓ or the unknown label ?.
As with static security typing, we develop gradual security types by assigning a gradual label to every type constructor.
Definition 2 (Gradual security type). A gradual security type is a gradual type labeled with a gradual label:
To give meaning to gradual security types, we use the AGT approach of defining a concretization function that maps gradual security types to sets of static security types. This concretization is the natural lifting of a concretization for gradual labels.
Definition 3 (Label Concretization). Let γ ℓ : GLABEL → P(LABEL) be defined as follows:
We give meaning to the unknown label by saying that it represents any label. On the other hand, any static label represents only itself.
Since we are operating on complete lattices, the sound and optimal abstraction function from sets of labels to gradual labels is fully determined by the concretization. We characterize it below.
Definition 4 (Label Abstraction). Let α ℓ : P(LABEL) → GLABEL be defined as follows:
Proof. By case analysis on the structure of
Proof. By case analysis on the structure ofl.
Having defined the meaning of gradual labels, we define the meaning of gradual security types via concretization.
Definition 5 (Type Concretization). Let γS : GTYPE → P(TYPE) be defined as follows:
With concretization of security type, we can now define security type precision.
Definition 6 (Label and Type Precision).

1.l1 is less imprecise thanl2, notationl1 ⊑l2, if and only if
γ ℓ (l1) ⊆ γ ℓ (l2); inductively:
2. S1 is less imprecise than S2, notation S1 ⊑ S2, if and only if γS( S1) ⊆ γS( S2); inductively:
S22
We now define the abstraction function.
Definition 7 (Type Abstraction).
Let the abstraction function αS : P(TYPE) → GTYPE be defined as:
We can only abstract valid sets of security types, i.e. in which elements only defer by security labels.
Definition 8 (Valid Type Sets)
.
Proposition 6 (αS is Sound).
Proof. By well-founded induction on Û S according to the ordering relation Û S Û S defined as follows:
Wheredom,ĉod : P(GTYPE) → P(GT ype) are the collecting liftings of the domain and codomain functions dom, cod respectively, e.g.,d
We then consider cases on Û S according to the definition of αS.
by induction hypotheses on { Si1 } and { Si2 }, and soundness of α ℓ .
Proposition 7 (αS is Optimal
Proof. By induction on the structure of S.
So Û S = { S1i → l i S2i }, with { S1i } ⊆ γS( S1), { S1i } ⊆ γS( S2), and { li } ⊆ γ ℓ (l). By induction hypotheses, αS({ S1i }) ⊑ S1 and αS({ S2i }) ⊑ S2, and by optimality of α ℓ ,
Consistent Predicates and Operators
Following the AGT approach, we lift predicates on labels and types to consistent predicates on the corresponding gradual labels and gradual types. Consistent predicates hold if some member of the collecting semantics satisfies the corresponding static predicate. We lift partial functions to gradual partial functions, as per the standard approach in abstract interpretation.
Definition 9 (Consistent label ordering).l1
l 2 if and only if ℓ1 ℓ2 for some (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ γ ℓ (l1) × γ ℓ (l2). Algorithmically:
Definition 10 (Gradual label join).
Both gradual label stamping and gradual join of security types are obtained by lifting their corresponding static operations:
Algorithmically:
We now lift subtyping to gradual security types.
Definition 12 (Consistent subtyping). S1 S2 if and only if S1 <: S2 for some (S1, S2) ∈ γS( S1) × γS( S2)
Gradual Security Type System
The gradual security type system is adapted from Figure 1 by lifting static types and labels to gradual types and labels, lifting partial functions on static types to partial functions on gradual types, and lifting predicates on types and labels to consistent predicates on gradual types and labels. The AGT approach yields a gradual counterpart to an underlying static type system that satisfies a number of desirable properties. To state these properties, the following propositions use ⊢S to denote the λSEC typing relation of Figure 1 .
Proposition 8 (Conservative Extension). For t ∈ TERM, ⊢S t : S if and only if ⊢ t : S
Proof. By induction over the typing derivations. The proof is trivial because static types are given singleton meanings via concretization.
In the following proposition, precision on terms t1 ⊑ t2 is the natural lifting of type precision to terms.
Proposition 9 (Static gradual guarantee). If ⊢ t1 : S1 and t1 ⊑ t2, then ⊢ t2 : S2 and S1 ⊑ S2.
Proof. Corollary of the corresponding proposition for open terms. By induction on typing derivation of Γ ⊢ t1 : S1 using the definition of t1 ⊑ t2.
Dynamic Semantics of Gradual Security Typing
Interiors of consistent subtyping and label ordering. The interior of a consistent judgment expresses the most precise deducible information about a consistent judgment. We define the interior of a judgment in terms of our abstraction.
Definition 13 (Interior). Let P be a binary predicate on static types. Then the interior of the judgment P ( T1, T2), notation
It is formalized as follows:
We use case-based analysis to calculate the algorithmic rules for the interior of consistent subtyping on gradual security types: The rules appeal to the algorithmic rules for the interior of consistent label ordering, calculated similarly: . Note that we do not need to introduce term stamping in this language. Since terms are intrinsically typed and we have ascriptions, labels can be stamped at the type level.
Reduction. Evaluation uses the consistent transitivity operator
• <: to combine evidences:
First we calculate a recursive meet operator for gradual types:
, or algorithmically:
We calculate a recursive definition for △ <: by case analysis on the structure of the second argument, △ (l1,l2,l3) = l 1,l3
( S31, S21, S11) = S31, S11 △ <: ( S12, S22, S32) = S12, S32 △ (l1,l2,l3) = l 1,l3
with the following definition of △ , again calculated by case analysis on the middle gradual label:
The reduction rules are given in Fig. 5 . The evidence inversion functions reflect the contravariance on arguments and the need to stamp security labels on return types:
Example
Consider a simple lattice with two confidentiality levels, L = ⊥ and H = ⊤, and the following extrinsic program definitions:
L an unknown channel that can be publicly used v false H a private value f v does not type check, but f (g v) does typecheck, even though it fails at runtime. Type checking yields the corresponding intrinsic definitions:
where the intrinsic subterms are essentially identical to their extrinsic counterparts: For conciseness, we abbreviate Booll withl, use S f and Sg to refer to the types of f and g, and elide the application operators @ S . At each step, we use grey boxes to highlight the focus of reduction/rewriting, and underline the result. ε ∈ EVIDENCE, et ∈ EVTERM, ev ∈ EVVALUE, u ∈ SIMPLEVALUE, t ∈ TERM * , v ∈ VALUE, g ∈ EVFRAME, f ∈ TMFRAME ε ::= S, S et ::= εt ev ::= εu u ::= x | bl | (λx.t)l
Notions of Reduction
Noninterference for λ SEC
We establish noninterference for the gradual security language using logical relations, adapting the technique from Zdancewic (2002) . First, in the intrinsic setting, the type environment related to an open term t is simply the set of (intrinsically-typed) free variables of the term, F V (t). We use the metavariable Γ ∈ P(VAR * ) to denote such "type-environments-as-sets".
Informally, the noninterference theorem states that a program with low (visible) output and a high (private) input can be run with different high-security values and, if terminating, will always yield the same observable value.
2
Theorem 10 (Noninterference). if t ∈ TERM Booll with F V (t) = { x } , x ∈ TERM S , and v1, v2 ∈ TERM S with label ( S) l , then
Proof. The result follows by using the method of logical relations (following Zdancewic (2002)), as a special case of Lemma 15 below.
Note that we compare equality of bare values at base types, stripping the checking-related information (labels, evidences and ascriptions): i.e. bval(bl) = b and bval(εbl :: S) = b. Also, gradual programs can fail. We establish termination-insensitive noninterference, meaning in particular that any program may run into an error without violating noninterference. Figure 6 . The notation v1 ≈ ζ v2 : S indicates that v1 is related to v2 at type S when observed at the security level ζ. Similarly, the notation t1 ≈ ζ t2 : C( S) indicates that t1 and t2 are related computations that produce related values at type S when observed at the security level ζ.
Definition 14 (Gradual security logical relations). For an arbitrary element ζ of the security lattice, the ζ-level gradual security relations are type-indexed binary relations on closed terms defined inductively as presented in
The logical relations are very similar to those of Zdancewic (2002) , except for the points discussed above and the fact that we account for subtyping in the relation between values at a function type (recall that our type system is syntax-directed).
Definition 15 (Secure program). A well-typed program t that produces a ζ-observable output of type S (i.e. label( S) ζ) is secure iff t ≈ ζ t : C( S).
Definition 16 (Related substitutions). Two substitutions σ1 and σ2
Lemma 11 (Substitution preserves typing). If t S ∈ TERM S and
Proof. By induction on the derivation of t S ∈ TERM S Lemma 12 (Reduction preserves relations). Consider t1, t2
The label function returns the top-level security label of the given type:
Proof. Direct by definition of t1 ≈ ζ t2 : C( S) and transitivity of −→ * .
Lemma 13 (Canonical forms). Consider a value v ∈ TERM S .
Then either v = u, or v = εu :: S with u ∈ TERM S ′ and ε ⊢ S ′ S. Furthermore:
1. If S = Booll then either v = bl or v = εbl′ :: Booll with bl′ ∈ TERM Booll ′ and ε ⊢ Booll′ Booll.
If
Proof. By direct inspection of the formation rules of gradual intrinsic terms (Figure 4 ).
Lemma 14 (Ascription preserves relation). Suppose
Proof. Following Zdancewic (2002) , the proof proceeds by induction on the judgment ε ⊢ S ′ S. The difference here is that consistent subtyping is justified by evidence, and that the terms have to be ascribed to exploit subtyping. In particular, case 1 above establishes a computation-level relation because each ascribed term (εvi :: S) may not be a value: each value vi is either a bare value ui or a casted value εiui :: Si, with εi ⊢ Si S. In the latter case, (ε(εiui :: Si) :: S) either steps to error (in which case the relation is vacuously established), or steps to ε ′ ui :: S, which is a value.
Noninterference follows directly from the following lemma, which establishes that substitution preserves the logical relations:
Proof. By induction on the derivation that t ∈ TERM S . Considering the last step used in the derivation:
By definition of substitution, assuming x S 1 ∈ dom(σi), and Lemma 11:
Ifl ζ the result holds trivially because all function values are related in such a cases. Assumel ζ, and assume two values v1 and v2 such that v1 ≈ ζ v2 : S ′ 1 , with ε2 ⊢ S ′ 1 S1. (We omit the @ S operator in applications below since we simply pick
Figure 6. Gradual security logical relations S = S1 →l S2.) We need to show that:
Each vi is either a bare value ui or a casted value ε2iui :: S ′ 1 . In the latter case, the application expression combines evidence, which may fail with error. If it succeeds, we call the combined evidence ε ′ 2i . The application rule then applies: it may fail with error if the evidence ε ′ 2i cannot be combined with the evidence for the function parameter. In all of the failure cases, the relation vacuously holds. We therefore consider the only interesting case, where the applications succeed. We have:
where εr and εai are the new evidences for the return value and argument, respectively. We then extend the substitutions to map x S 1 to the casted arguments:
By Lemma 14.1, (εa1u1 :: S1) ≈ ζ (εa2u2 :: S1) : S1
. By induction hypothesis:
By the definition of substitution, this is exactly:
Finally, since εr ⊢ S2 S2 ≺ ℓ, by Lemma 14.2:
By backward preservation of the relations (Lemma 12), this implies that:
By definition of substitution and Lemma 11:
By induction hypotheses:
By definition of related computations:
By Lemma 13, each vij is either a boolean (bij)l ij or a casted boolean εij(bij )l′ ij :: Sj . In case a value vij is a casted value, then the whole term σi(t S ) can take a step by (Rg), combining εi with εij. Such a step either fails, or succeeds with a new combined evidence. Therefore, either:
in which case we do not care since we only consider terminationinsensitive noninterference, or:
. It remains to show that: ζ, which means by definition of ≈ ζ on boolean values, that b11 = b21 and b12 = b22, so b1 = b2.
with ε1 ⊢ S1 S11 →l S12, ε2 ⊢ S2 S11, and S = S12 ≺ ℓ.
We omit the @ S 11 →l S 12 operator in applications below.
By induction hypothesis:
By definition of ≈ ζ at values of function type, using ε1 and ε2 to justify the subtyping relations, we have:
Ifl ζ, then σ1(t S ) ≈ ζ σ2(t S ) : C( S) holds trivially because the ≈ ζ relations relate all such well-typed terms. Let us assumel ζ. By the induction hypothesis we have that:
Assuming σi(t S 1 ) −→ * vi1, by the definition of ≈ ζ we have:
By Lemma 13, each vi1 is either a boolean (bi1)l i1 or a casted boolean εi1(bi1)l′ i1 :: S1. In either case, S1 Booll
, so by definition of ≈ ζ on boolean values, b11 = b21.
In case a value vi1 is a casted value, then the whole term σi(t S ) can take a step by (Rg), combining εi with εi1. Such a step either fails, or succeeds with a new combined evidence. Therefore, either:
Because b11 = b21, both σ1(t S ) and σ2(t S ) step into the same branch of the conditional. Let us assume the condition is true (the other case is similar). Then:
Assume σi(t S 2 ) −→ * vi2, then v12 ≈ ζ v22 : S2. Since ε2 ⊢ S2 S, by Lemma 14 we have:
---Case (::). t S = εt S 1 :: S, with t S 1 ∈ TERM S 1 and ε1 ⊢ S1 S. By definition of substitution:
The result follows directly by Lemma 14.
Related Work and Conclusion
The design of a gradual security-typed language is a novel contribution. Despite the fact that both Disney and Flanagan (2011) and Fennell and Thiemann (2013) have proposed languages for security typing dubbed gradual, they do not propose gradual source languages. Rather, the language designs require explicit security casts-which can also be encoded with a label test expression in Jif (Zheng and Myers 2007) . Furthermore, both designs treat an unlabeled type as having the top label, then allowing explicit casts downward in the security lattice. This design is analogous to the internal language of the quasi-static typing approach. In that approach, explicit casts work well, but the external language there accepts too many programs. That difficulty was the original motivation for consistency in gradual typing (Siek and Taha 2006) . Thiemann and Fennell (2014) develop a generic approach to gradualize annotated type systems. This is similar to security typing (labels are one kind of annotation), except that they only consider annotation on base types, and the language only includes explicit casts, like the gradual security work discussed above. They track blame and provide a translation that removes unnecessary casts.
A. Auxiliary Proofs Proposition 1. If Γ ⊢ t : S then Γ ⊢ Z t : S.
Proof. By induction on Γ ⊢ t : S. As most of the type rules are identical, most of the cases are straightforward. The exceptions to this are the (Sif) and (Sapp) rules. Case (Sif). Then D = D0 Γ ⊢ t0 : Bool ℓ D1 Γ ⊢ t1 : S1 D2 Γ ⊢ t2 : S2 Γ ⊢ if t0 then t1 else t2 : (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ By Lemma 16, S1 <: (S1 <: S2) and S2 <: (S1 <: S2), and by Lemma 17 (S1 <: S2) <: (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ, therefore S1 <: (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ and S2 <: (S1 <: S2) ≺ ℓ. Combining these with the induction hypotheses, we get
Case (Sapp). Then t = t1 t2 and Γ ⊢ t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ for some S12 and ℓ such that Γ ⊢ t1 : S11 → ℓ S12, Γ ⊢ t2 : S2 and S2 <: S11. Using induction hypothesis on t2 we know that Γ ⊢ Z t2 : S2. As S2 <: S11. Then by (λSEC-SUB) Γ ⊢ Z t2 : S11. Using induction hypothesis on t1, Γ ⊢ Z t1 : S11 → ℓ S12, then by (λSEC-APP) we conclude that Γ ⊢ Z t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ Lemma 16. Let S1, S2 ∈ TYPE. Then 1. If (S1 <: S2) is defined then S1 <: (S1 <: S2).
If (S1
<: S2) is defined then (S1 <: S2) <: S1.
Proof. We start by proving (1) assuming that (S1 ≺ S2) is defined. We proceed by case analysis on S1.
Case (Bool ℓ ). If S1 = Bool ℓ 1 then as (S1 <: S2) is defined then S2 must have the form Bool ℓ 2 for some ℓ2. Therefore (S1 <: S2) = Bool (ℓ 1 ≺ ℓ 2 ) . But by definition of , ℓ1 (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2) and therefore we use (<: Bool ) to conclude that Bool ℓ 1 <: Bool (ℓ 1 ≺ ℓ 2 ) , i.e. S1 <: (S1 <: S2).
Case (S → ℓ S). If S1 = S11 → ℓ 1 S12 then as (S1 <: S2) is defined then S2 must have the form S21 → ℓ 2 S22 for some S21, S22 and ℓ2. We also know that (S1 <: S2) = (S11 <: S21) → (ℓ 1 ≺ ℓ 2 ) (S12 <: S22). By definition of , ℓ1 (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2). Also, as (S1 <: S2) is defined then (S11 <: S21) is defined. Using the induction hypothesis of (2) on S11, (S11 <: S21) <: S11. Also, using the induction hypothesis of (1) on S12 we also know that S12 <: (S12 <: S22). Then by (<:→) we can conclude that S11 → ℓ 1 S12 <: (S11 <: S21) → (ℓ 1 ≺ ℓ 2 ) (S12 <: S22), i.e. S1 <: (S1 <: S2).
The proof of (2) is similar to (1) but using the argument that (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2) ℓ1.
Lemma 17. Let S ∈ TYPE and ℓ ∈ LABEL. Then S <: S ≺ ℓ.
Proof. Straigthforward case analysis on type S using the fact that ℓ (ℓ ′ ≺ ℓ) for any ℓ ′ .
Lemma 18. Let S1, S2 ∈ TYPE such that S1 <: S2, and let ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ LABEL such that ℓ1 ℓ2. Then S1 ≺ ℓ1 <: S2 ≺ ℓ2.
Proof. Straightforward case analysis on type S using the definition of label stamping on types.
Proposition 2. If Γ ⊢ Z t : S Then Γ ⊢ t : S ′ for some S ′ <: S.
